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lato’s dialogues, the Symposium, and Phaedrus, provide a reasonable 
explanation of love.  G. Vlastos and M. Nussbaum do not share such an 
opinion.  The former contends that Plato’s view of love is about loving 
only a person’s beauty, but not the entire person; thus, it falls short of an 
appropriate explanation of love.  The latter holds that a theory of love should 
be complete, and that Plato’s one is incomplete on the grounds that it does not 
account for personal love.  These criticisms will be re-evaluated in light of the 
duality of love (the white and non-white horses—in Phaedrus) as well as 
participants’ views in the Symposium; a re-assessment will weaken the mentioned 
objections.  This paper contends that from the Symposium and Phaedrus, one 
can have a fruitful understanding of being in love, being out of love, falling in 
love, loving for its own sake and being erotically in love.    In order to account 
for these related issues of love it is important to consider Plato’s works in 
terms of his “official” and “unofficial” views.  The former is construed as the 
doctrine of the lover or loving for its own sake: this is associates with 
Diotima’s views which are repeated by Socrates.  With reference to the latter, it 
is possible to explain what personal love or being in love, being out of love, 
falling in love, and being erotically in love involve.  Erotic love will be 
interpreted as an extension of our philosophical conception of love, related to 
views of love that are mentioned in the Symposium other than Socrates’ report 
of Diotima’s conceptions.  This paper is divided into two parts: the first one 
will show views of love in the Symposium.  That is, being in love, being out of 
love, falling in love and loving for its own sake will be discussed.  In addition, 
the forementioned criticisms will be re-evaluated.  In the second section, we 
will show that Aristophanes’ speech expresses erotic love, and then Kant’s 
objections will be explained and discussed.   
 
Part One: Unofficial notion of love and the concept of being 
in love 
 
In the Symposium, Agathon invited Socrates and others to his banquet.  
Including the host, there were eleven of them, and the twelfth being drunk 
entered when the banquet was nearly finished.  On that particular occasion, 
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A.  SULAIMAN     79 
each participant speaks about what love is.  Sitting in a circle and speaking 
from left to right, the first speaker is Phaedrus.1  
Phaedrus presents an explanation of being in love in accordance with 
the origin of love: there was chaos and then the first god, Eros - the first-light, 
was born.2  Eros (lust, love and sex) organizes everything in the universe 
according to his own nature.  Phaedrus’ notion of love suggests a conqueror of 
chaos, and that love is something good and honorable.  If there were no love 
among human beings, we would live in a state of chaos.  Harmony is insured 
by love among people which naturally lead to procreation.   While it is not a 
necessary condition of love per se, Phaedrus’ inclusion of procreation leads to a 
contextual import of sexual intercourse or carnal pleasure in the discourse.   
Meanwhile, interpreting love in terms of being in love follows the discussion of 
affection, friendship, cooperation, and mutual respect as contingents to 
personal love.   As it is appropriate to hold that Phaedrus’ view of love, being a 
cornerstone in our pursuit and life, involves the agreeable and passionate life 
with others;  love then for Phaedrus is considered as personal and passionate – 
an intimate bond between lovers. 
In proving that love is “the greatest good, Phaedrus proceeds by 
showing how lovers act in certain situations.   Love inspires lovers to do 
exceptional things that are considered to be honorable and heroic: “Besides, no 
one will die for you but a lover, and a lover will do this even if she’s a 
woman.”4 Being in love for Phaedrus is like being in an inspired state of 
madness; this is positive in terms of what a lover can do for his beloved.  He 
adds: “If only there were a way to start a city or an army made up of lovers and 
the boys they love(,) (t)heirs would be the best possible system of society, for 
they would hold back from all that is shameful, and seek honor in each others’ 
eyes(.) Even a few of them, in battle side by side, would conquer all the world, 
I’d say.”5 A lover is willing to sacrifice his own life for his beloved; lovers are 
the best people for protecting one another.  All this does not only indicate an 
intense and intimate relationship between lovers, but it also shows that their 
relationship and affection toward one another are mutual.  For instance, in 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, both the lover and the beloved commit 
suicide because they are prevented from living their lives passionately and 
sexually together – sharing themselves equally.6  Provisionally, our discussion 
of being in love between lovers involves mutual attraction, affection, sexual 
intercourse, sensibility, and intellectual responses: all these sorts of sharing we 
usually consider as personal love.  Although Phaedrus shows us what lovers 
                                                 
1 Great Dialogues of Plato, trans. by W.H.D. Rouse and ed. by Eric H. Warmington and 
Philip G.  Rouse (New York: A Mentor Book, 1956), 73. 
2 Plato, Symposium, trans. by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Co., 1989), 178B.  Other references will be abbreviated as Symposium, 
followed by paragraphs numbers. 
4 Ibid., 179B. 
5 Ibid., 178E-179A. 
6 W. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, ed. by B.A Mowat and P. Werstine (New York: A 
Washington Square Press, 1992).    
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and beloved can do for each other in the Symposium, in the dialogue Phaedrus, 
he informs us about the consequences when the opposite occurs. 
 
Phaedrus presents Lysias’ concept of being out of 
love   
  
Phaedrus, which is about making speech, Plato reports the dialogue 
between Socrates and Phaedrus.  Phaedrus accepts the content of the written 
speech from Lysias, the son of Cephalus, and reads it to Socrates.  The script 
provides an eloquent analysis of the experiences of being out of love, of which 
interpretation provides us with Plato’s unofficial view.  
Lysias’ letter, which can be summarized in three sentences, reveals that 
being in love does not always lead to a permanent commitment between lovers; 
there are negative consequences in being in love, and we should interpret them 
as leading up to a transition from being in love to being out of love.  To say 
that being in love is in a transitional state is to also affirm that a lover 
suppresses his emotional, sensual, and sexual attraction from the beloved, and 
this kind of stagnated period can continue until a separation occurs between 
them – being out of love.  Being out of love can occur in any of the following 
ways: 
 
1.  a dependable relation between people without carnal pleasure, 
2.  sexual intercourse without any emotional attachment, and 
3.  the absence of emotional and sexual relationship. 
 
First, it generally refers to a person’s relationship to beautiful things, 
people, as well as interpersonal relationships, friendship, the upholding of 
responsibilities, feeling duty bound, a tendency to be altruistic, etc.  All these 
are considered as dependency relations without sex.  Generally, a mutual desire 
of sexual intercourse is absent, acknowledging that one partner may desire 
carnal pleasure while the other does not.  The first point does not exclude the 
following situation: one lover falls out while the beloved still loves the lover; 
this is considered as being out of love.  In addition, dependency relations or 
secondary ones can be mutual, and they are about a lover’s commitment and 
agreement to the beloved; they can be about formal or informal contracts or 
agreements between individuals.  There can also be a unilateral decision and 
action from a particular partner to still desire the other without actually being 
in love with that person; in this case, the sexual component is not missing.  
Second, though personal love involves attraction, sensuality, and cognitive and 
sexual responses toward each other as reciprocal, it shows that sexual 
intercourse and causal sex without other components of personal love.  The 
last point should be construed as another instance of being out of love, and it 
occurs if both lovers agree on a psychophysical separation from one another.   
With being out of love, we do not deny that lovers can occasionally 
revamp their relationship to the level of being in love, but this depends on the 
participants themselves.  With respect to the distinction between a lover and a  
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non-lover, Lysias writes: “You should know that a lover regrets the favours he 
does once his desire comes to an end, whereas it stands to reason that there is 
never a time when a non-lover will change his mind.  For if he exerts himself 
to do a favour, he does so willingly (.)” 7 Though there can be an abrupt or 
gradual transition from being in love to being out of love, Lysias writes that 
being passionately in love seems to be a temporary commitment, and he adds 
that when people are in love, they neglect their friends, families, properties, etc.  
They often try very hard to please one another, and while a lover realizes how 
little his world has become, his sensibility toward the beloved has drastically 
declined; hate, quarrel, jealousy, and anger surge up and undermine being in 
love.  Accordingly, a lover might prefer someone else.  Though this is the case, 
one may consider Phaedrus’ view as insufficient; within this context, Lysias’ 
contention should be seen as a development of Phaedrus’ one.  In support of 
the concept of being out of love, Kierkegaard agrees that one cannot be in love 
with more than one person at a time because being in love involves an equally 
reciprocal participation between lovers.8 Lysias also points out that many 
young individuals fall in love without knowing their own characters very well, 
and some of them eventually fall out of love – being out of love.9 
With respect to being out of love, Gass writes: “Love wears out like a 
suit of clothes.  Love comes and goes like the cloud.  Love is the lie of the 
lover and the belief of the beloved.”10 Today it is much easier to share one’s 
life with another without raising the issue of love between partners.  Gass 
agrees with Phaedrus on ‘genuine’ lovers are rare; it is important to specify that 
Gass is referring to being in love which transforms to being out of love and 
contingent or dependent relations hold partners together; he also affirms 
Lysias’ view of temporary love.  Generally, Gass and Lysias show us that 
Phaedrus’ conception of love is incomplete.  We will look at other related 
views of love in the Symposium.   
After Phaedrus’ explanation of personal love as an intense activity of 
being in love in the Symposium, the next speaker, Pausanias, expresses his view 
of love in terms of heavenly and common love.   
Pausanias contributes to our understanding of love by expounding its 
duality and refining Phaedrus’ view.   He is arguing for heavenly love and 
common love (being in love), which is spiritual and about the intellectual 
pursuit of justice, fairness, knowledge, companionship, beauty, societal health, 
and others.   He furthers that one can love justice, beauty and health, but one 
cannot be in love with health or justice.   
                                                 
7 Phaedrus, trans. by Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 231a.   
8 This position by Soren Kierkeggard can be found in both o6f his books Either/Or, 
Vol. 1, trans. by D.  Swenson and L. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959) and  
Works of Love, trans. by H. Hong and E. Hong (New York: Harper and Row, 1952). 
9 Phaedrus, 231d. 
10 W. Gass, “Throw the Emptiness out of Your Arms,” in The Philosophy of Erotic Love, ed. 
by Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 
453.  
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Pausanias argues that bodily love suggests a temporal duration since 
the human body undergoes overt changes, and that it is that being pursued by 
the common people.11 He is also concerned with humans’ exploitation of and 
in love – with lovers taking advantage of the beloved as older men sexually 
abuse young boys, etc.  (it is not possible to discuss pederasty in this paper). 
Pausanias holds that there should be laws in society to deter unjust 
relationships.  He states: “As a matter of fact, there should be law forbidding 
affairs with young boys… Good men, of course, are willing to make a law like 
this for themselves, but those lovers, the vulgar ones, need external restraint.  
These vulgar lovers are the people who have given love such a bad 
reputation(.)”12 Some old men do not only take young boys to educate them 
about society laws and politics, but they also make them their lovers; Pausanias 
forcefully objects to coercive sexual practices.  Nonetheless, common love 
between people is beautiful when both parties benefit, and when the reward is 
not of mutual advantages, it is considered as ugly.   Furthermore, Pausanias 
indicates that the sentiments that love produces in a person are themselves 
noble.   Thus, personal love is said to be noble. 
 
Falling in Love 
 
Pausanias emphasizes the duality of love without showing how they 
are related, and the next speaker in the Symposium, is Eryximachos.  Though his 
view is unofficial, we will examine this perspective in terms of falling in love. 
Eryximachos argues for a balance between heavenly (spiritual) love 
and common (physical) love.  He states: “Such is the power of love—so varied 
and great that in all cases it might be called absolute.  Yet even so it is for 
greater when love is directed, in temperance and justice, toward the good, 
whether in heaven or on earth: happiness and good fortune, the bonds of 
human society, concord with the gods above—all these are among his gifts.”13 
Though Phaedrus shows us the pratical aspect of love, Eryximachos develops 
the mentioned point and further states that health is beautiful and that diseases 
are ugly, but they exist in the same body.  Because we have practical 
knowledge, we can change one state to another in order to bring about a 
moderate state of affairs.  In this context, a person is not only conceived 
physically, but his sense of justice, goodness, compassion, kindness is also 
valuable.  If a person has certain undesirable attitudes or personalities, it is 
possible to change them, like curing a disease.  Eryximachos contends that it is 
possible to teach a brute to love because he has the capacity to love and further 
holds that a good practitioner can cure a sick person: “In short, medicine is 
simply the science of the effects of love on repletion and depletion of the 
body, and the hallmark of the accomplished physicians is his ability to 
distinguish the love that is noble from the love that is ugly and disgraceful.  A 
                                                 
11 Symposium, 181B. 
12 Ibid., 181E. 
13 Ibid., 188D-188E.  
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good practitioner knows how to affect the body and how to transform its 
desires; he can implant the proper species of love when it is absent and 
eliminate the other sort whenever it occurs.”14 This view suggests that 
psychiatrics, psychologists, and marriage counsels try to help people to deal 
with and to sort out their personal and interpersonal problems in order to live 
a ‘normal’ life in society with their partners, reviving love.   
Eryximachos states that a patient can recover from an illness and then 
learns how to prevent certain sicknesses.  This issue is related to education: a 
person can learn about justice, fairness, etc.  Is it possible to really teach a 
person to love, say, another person sensually, emotionally, and passionately?  
One may be inclined to argue that Eryximachos’ notion of teaching a 
person to love is suspicious, it is possible.  In her book, Erotic Morality, Linda 
Holler reports two case studies of women who suffer from a form of autism, 
asperger syndrome: “…Asperger patients are socially insolated, cut off from 
the intersubjective world by an inability to perceive the subjective life of 
others.”15 These patients are prisoners of their own bodies because they lack 
the feeling capacities of their bodies, such as, sensory feelings, emotions, 
drives, and instincts.16 Being alienated from others emotionally, sensually, 
cognitively, and unable to recognize bodily changes, Grandin, a patient, learns 
to overcome her problems by squeezing herself on a squeeze machine – a 
device that is used to hold cattle in place for branding and castration.   
Eventually, the patient experiences sensations, tactile stimulations, emotions, 
and feelings.  Holler argues: “Human cognition finds its evolutionary ground in 
our sensory-emotional life, and our emotions remain the first and still primary 
means by which we give material expression to our being in the 
world…Instead, cognition emerges in the totality that is the lived body, and 
organism in continual, reciprocal interaction with the world.”17 The crux of the 
matter is that cognition is not debarred from our emotions and sensibility.  She 
adds: “The values of intimacy, relatedness, responsibility, caring, and 
compassion are erotic values arising from sensory feeling and emotional 
connectedness.”18 This claim suggests that from a person’s own sensibility she 
can discern love from hate, pain from pleasure, good from bad, etc.  However, 
Holler does not deny that a person cannot have a rational conception of pain 
or pleasure; she shows that without having a receptive body that experiences 
pain or pleasure, a person will have an incomplete understanding of not only 
others but also of her own emotions and feelings.  That is, a person must be 
consciously aware of her own body and that others are similar in order to 
develop subjective and intersubjective relationships.  Her view shows that a 
sick body can be healed; after a healing process, the ability to love is possible.  
From one’s own sensibility, one learns caring, compassion, responsibility, 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 186E-186D. 
15 L. Holler, Erotic Morality (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 16. 
16 Ibid., 77. 
17 Ibid., 60-61. 
18 Ibid., 62.  
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friendship, and emotional and sensual attachment.  Thus, Holler’s perspective 
shows us what the prerequisite of falling in love is. 
The issue whether we can teach a person to fall in love with another 
can be answered affirmatively.  In Saint Exupéry’s  The Little Prince, he shows 
how friendship can develop to love.  The prince who is looking for friends 
meets the fox, and the fox says: “To me, you are still nothing more than a little 
boy who is just like a hundred thousand other little boys.  And I have no need 
for you.  And you, on your part, have no need for me.  To you, I am nothing 
more than a fox like a hundred thousand other foxes.  But if you tame me, 
then we shall need each other.  To me, you will be unique in all the world.  To 
you, I shall be unique in all the world.”19 One may argue that there is a mutual 
attraction between the prince and the fox, and both of them want to know 
each other ‘better’.  The fox teaches the prince about cultural values and that 
one must be patient in taming: “First you will sit down at a little distance from 
me – like that – in the grass.  I shall look at you out of the corner of my eye, 
and you will say nothing.  Words are the source of misunderstanding.  But you 
will sit a little closer to me, every day.”20 Physical attractions are the primary 
contact between indiviuals, and then they follow proper rites.  Exupéry states: 
“If, for example, you come at four o’clock in the afternoon, … I shall begin to 
be happy.  I shall feel happier and happier as the hour advances.  At four 
o’clock, I shall already worry and jumping about.  I shall show you how happy 
I am.  But if you come at just any time, I shall never know at what hour my 
heart is to be ready to greet you.”21 Falling in love involves at least two persons 
who are physically attracted to one another; in most cases, such an attraction is 
emotional, sensual, and cognitive.  Exupéry eloquently describes: “It is only 
with the heart that one can see rightly; what is essential is invisible to the 
eyes.”22 We are not alluding to the notion that there is a right or wrong way in 
falling in love which often leads to being in love.  Accordingly to cultural 
values, falling in love usually takes one form as opposed to others, and it is 
possible to teach people cultural values in which personal love is endorsed.   
In The Little Prince, the fox asks the prince to tame her.  With respect 
to the situation and the type of love under consideration, namely falling in love, 
we are untamed; and yet, we are like an open book to others, revealing certain 
characteristics: height, eye color, complexion, weight, age, and other observable 
features.  The fox insists that certain cultural rules should be followed in 
attracting another person, using body language.  Holler also informs us that a 
person should tame himself first, experiencing his own sensibility, and from his 
affection and sensuality, he can share his feelings with others.  In other words, 
a tamer firstly tames himself, so that others can infer from his behavior other 
qualities.   
                                                 
19 Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, The Little Prince (New York: Harbrace Paperbound Library, 
1971), 84. 
20 Ibid., 84.   
21 Ibid., 84. 
22 Ibid., 87.  
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Meanwhile, Socrates indicates that love is a creative force that pursues 
beautiful things, and each person is endeavor with the potential to love.  His 
view also suggests that everyone chooses his love from the ranks of beauty 
according to his character, and this he makes his god, and fashions and adorns 
as a sort of image which he worships.23 Each person carries a representation of 
an ideal person for him or her, and when someone comes along, nearly fitting 
his or her mental representation, there might be an attraction between both 
persons, granted that both of their representations generally match.  Though 
they can be mental attraction (views, ideas, beliefs, etc.), the most common one 
is physical; in forming attachment, individuals are interested in sharing 
themselves.  Thus, similarities are highly affirmed and dissimilarities often slip 
their attentions or are undermined.  Since falling in love tends to involve 
mutual attraction, sensuality, etc., similarities among people can bring 
individuals together and then love can flurish among compatable partners.  In 
addition, age plays an important role in attractions; for example, the young seek 
sexual partners and the old desire partnership and friendship.  Thus, falling in 
love is not a quality of the white horse though both horses respond to beauty, 
the white horse represents a denial of a reciprocal relationship.  All this we will 
examine in the forthcoming section. 
 
Plato’s view of Love 
 
In the Symposium, Agathon, who spoke after Aristophanes, emphasizes 
on the beloved; accordingly, there are three central points to consider.  First, he 
provides a dualistic conception of love and tries to identify the quality of love.  
Love is the youngest god who is beautiful and young.  In human beings, love 
seeks moderation and it has a moral character.  Unlike Plato’s interpretation of 
cardinal virtues, Agathon conceives of justice, bravery, and wisdom as self-
control, bravest, and artistic skills, respectively; he also holds that the desire to 
create or produce works of art is influenced by love.  He further contends that 
love is drawn to beautiful things not ugly ones.24  Second, Socrates rejects 
Agathon’s argument of love.  Third, after Socrates questions Agathon, certain 
premises about love seem to be clear, and Socrates uses them as his starting 
point about love. Agathon accepts the following
                                                 
23 Phaedrus, 252a – e.    
24 Symposium, 197C.  
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premises.25 
 
1.  Love is the love of something, and it desires that which it is the love 
of. 
2.  If love desires something it needs, there is a necessary relation between 
the desire and object of love. 
3.  Love is the preservation of what a person has and wants to have in the 
future. 
4.  Love is the love of beautiful and good things not ugly ones.   
 
Though Agathon’s perspective is considered as a transition to Plato’s 
official view of love and his conception of reality, we will look at Socrates’ 
notion of falling in love and being in love with respect to his simile, the two 
horses and charioteer.   
In the dialogue, Phaedrus, Socrates explains the creation and 
reincarnation of the soul.  In addition, he uses a simile to account for how the 
soul is moved: a charioteer with a pair of winged horses of which one of them 
is white and is of noble breed.  This is an obedient horse which seeks wisdom, 
beauty, goodness, or the essence of external things – forms, goodness, and 
beauty.  Thus, it is considered as the pilot of the soul, and it pursues beauty.26 
The other horse is dark, is of ignoble breed, and does not heed to the 
charioteer’s whip.  It seeks earthly pleasure.  The non-white horse seeks 
physical pleasure, and Plato describes flattering love as falling in love and being 
in love for mortals in the lengthy forthcoming quote.     
 
But when someone who has only recently been initiated, 
(251a) and who took in plenty of the sights to be seen 
then, sees a marvelous face or a bodily form which is a 
good reflection of beauty, at first he shivers and is 
gripped by something like the fear he felt then, and the 
sight also moves him to revere about being though 
completely insane that stops him from sacrificing to his 
beloved as if he were a cult-statute or a god.  Following 
this sight, the kind of change comes over him that you 
would expect a shivering fit, and he begins to sweat and 
to run an unusually high fever, because the reception 
through his eyes of the effusion of beauty causes him to 
get hot… (I)n fact, (251c) the soul of someone who is 
beginning to grow wings experiences exactly the same 
sensations that children feel when they are teething, with 
their teeth just starting to grow, and they feel an itching 
and a soreness in their gums… It (251e) is too disturbed 
to sleep at night or stay still by day, and it rushes around 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 199E-201D. 
26 Phaedrus, 246a-246b.    
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to wherever it thinks it might see the boy who bears the 
beauty it longs for.  The sight of him opens the irrigation 
channels of desire and frees the former blockage; it finds 
relief and an end to the stinging pain, and once more 
enjoys this, for the time being, as the most intense 
pleasure.  This (252a) is not something it willingly does 
without, and it values no one more than the beautiful 
boy.  It is oblivions to mothers, brothers, and it friends… 
Indeed, it is ready to play the part of a slave and to sleep 
wherever it is allowed to, as long as it is as close as 
possible to the object of its desire…(T)his (252b) is the 
experience men call love(.)27 
 
Since we are trying to understand the concept of being in love, the 
symbol of the non-white horse is of importance because it suggests how 
personal love manifests itself in terms of enjoying beauty, say, a person, and 
that love often has a temporal duration between lovers.  The soul responds to 
beauty; as both the white and the dark horse are affected by the presence of 
beauty; we can interpret this as falling in love.  The dark horse experiences 
beauty as being in love, and beauty, the object of love, is also attracted to the 
lover; thus, an intense emotional feeling with sexual attraction between a lover 
and the beloved emerges.  We notice that in terms of being in love the entire 
person is affected because a lover desires the beloved as much as the beloved 
wants the lover.  Moreover, because the dark horse seeks earthly pleasure, it 
can be in love with beauty; alternatively, this is considered as personal love but 
not as self-love. 
The white one, on the other hand, cannot experience being in love 
with respect to having a mutual relationship; it can only love beauty and 
goodness, for it mostly reveals a lover’s feelings and beliefs about the object of 
love.  Furthermore, the white horse can suffer the consequences of the dark 
horse by making the soul descends to a lower level.  If this is the case, Socrates 
cannot be in love as in being in love because he has ascended.  Socrates’ white 
horse is stronger than his dark one.  All this shows that it is appropriate to hold 
in accordance with the nature of the dark horse, a person can be in love, being 
in love.  Thus, Plato also explores lovers’ emotional attachment, desires of 
sexual pleasure, and intellectual responses in terms of being in love.  Physical 
attractions between lovers, emotional and sensual desires of each other, the 
need to be together, and a degree of madness are positive sentiments between 
lovers.  All this shows an intense relationship and a continuation from falling in 
love to being in love.  The dark horse seeks passionate love and wants to enjoy 
beauty sensually and emotionally; thus, it is appropriate to hold that sensuality 
and emotions are some characteristics of personal love.  Since the dark horse is 
stubborn and does not always heed to the charioteer’s whip, it desires beauty in 
the context of being in love.  Thus, Plato shows us what in involved in being in 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 251a-252b.  
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love in terms of the dark horse; accordingly, his notion of personal love is 
unofficial. 
In the Symposium, Plato’s official view of love is expressed by Diotima 
– Socrates’ mentor.  Socrates accounts how she questions him and they agree 
on certain premises: In the questioning process, we learn about the quality of 
love: it is a great spirit that is between mortal and immortal; it is neither 
beautiful nor good, but it desires good and beautiful things as its object.  The 
origin of love comes about from the union between a god and a mortal, and 
human beings desire immortality which can be attained through love.   
According to Diotima, love gives birth in beauty, and this can occur in 
two ways: though the soul and body.  The former is the most efficient mean 
for acquiring immortality: love desires beautiful and good things and is 
attracted to beautiful bodies.  The latter involves giving birth.  Through 
reproduction, a mortal strives for immortality.  Socrates indicates that 
procreation involves both the soul and body, and it is a divine urge in mortal.  
The desire to procreate is evoked by beautiful things not ugly ones.  Some 
people express their creative force through birthing; this is beautiful, and it is a 
process of immortality.  For Plato, birthing is link to the spiritual world 
because it is a continuous process – not an end in itself.  One may point out 
that birthing does not occur without any meaningful human relationships, such 
as affection, mutual respect, and trust.  It seems that personal love is implicitly 
acknowledged in birthing because the concept of continuation presupposes 
certain fundamental requisites: living together, caring, education, etc.  Partners 
are considered as a team, and this in inferred from the claim: birthing is not 
considered as an end but as a process which requires certain basic cooperation 
and caring between partners.  One may argue that this is a very narrow 
conception of personal love.  Though this may be the case, it gives a valuable 
reason why a man and woman want to live together.  If there is no personal 
love, birthing is reduced to breeding; Plato’s view suggests that caring and 
responsibility are included in birthing because it is a creative process.  Thus, 
with respect to our interpretation of being in love, an affirmation of a mutual 
relationship between a lover and the beloved is established. 
It is appropriate to hold that Socrates experiences being out of love.  
In the Symposium,  an explicit distinction between the beloved and a lover or 
being a lover shows us that more emphasis is placed on the lover than on the 
object of love.  The lover’s pursuit and experience are of importance; Socrates 
indicates that a true lover seeks immortality and states: “…when he makes 
contact with someone beautiful and keeps company with him, he conceives 
and gives birth to what he has been carrying inside him for ages.”28 According 
to Plato’s official view, a lover must nourish his soul, and by doing this, he 
nurtures human relationships without indulging in carnal pleasure.  In addition, 
one should interpret how a lover devotes to beautiful bodies.  Socrates states: 
“(B)eauty of all bodies is one and the same.”29 In the Symposium, Plato 
                                                 
28 Symposium, 209C. 
29 Ibid., 210B.  
 
 
A.  SULAIMAN     81 
expresses that a lover can freely move from one instance of beauty to another 
in order to ascent.  He explains: “The result is that he will see the beauty of 
knowledge and be looking mainly not a beauty in a single example, … but the 
lover is turned to the great sea of beauty… (H)e catches sight of such 
knowledge and it is the knowledge of such beauty.”30 Accordingly, one tends to 
conceive of a philosopher as a lover of wisdom, for he is a seeker of 
immorality through his soul rather than through birthing or personal love.  For 
Plato, love is one spirit among several which pursues goodness and beautiful 
things, and through the medium of love, a lover can arrive at the Highest 
Good – a mystical state of consciousness.    
Since the objects of love are beautiful things, what are beautiful things? 
How should a person pursue beautiful things? In answering these questions, 
one will observes that it is possible to love beauty, a person, for its own sake 
and that it is possible to love several things simultaneously.  This aspect of love 
is better understood in terms of the white horse, or being out of love.  In 
Phaedrus, the white horse is of noble breed and it participates in beauty, 
goodness, and forms.  The soul has a recollection of beautiful things and 
beauty is pursued through contemplation.  Socrates states that a man must 
have intelligence of universals and be able to proceed from the many 
particulars of sense to one conception of reason; he relates this to the 
recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following god, and 
it strives toward its true nature.31 This fits in well with Plato’s view of reality as 
being dualistic.  The world of becoming refers to the physical world that is 
available to our senses and we perceive changes; the other is the world of being 
which is the world of forms and ideas and they are absolute, independent, 
transcendent, and never change.  The latter causes the world of becoming and 
the nature of things.  The soul has a recollection of the world of being 
(universals) and (particulars) in the world of becoming which partakes in the 
world of being.  Thus, when the soul perceives beauty, a person, it recognizes 
another is also beautiful, and so on.  The soul ascents; that is, its wings swell in 
the presence of beauty.  Accordingly, Socrates’ version of love is a lover of 
beautiful things, and beautiful things are perceived by the mind and propel the 
soul upward.  In Phaedrus, Socrates reminds us that at the sight of beauty, the 
beloved, the dark horse wants to stop and enjoy it.  Though it wants to obtain 
pleasure, the charioteer will try his best to refrain the dark horse from its goal.  
Moreover, Plato’s official view of love is shown by the white horse, pursuing 
the good through love.   
Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus explore the duality of love.  Socrates 
prefers the highest order of love (being out of love) by explaining that love is a 
lover of beautiful things and lovers are inspired by beautiful things in order to 
ascent; he is not particularly concerned with personal love – the nature of the 
dark horse – because Phaedrus has already accounted for it.  The white horse 
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reflects Socrates’ nature in accordance with neither of them can experience 
being in love.   
Socrates is explicit about what he means by the phrase ‘the love of 
beauty’, a person’s beauty will not show itself to him like a face or hands or any 
bodily parts at all, nor as a discourse or a science, nor as residing in anything, 
but being by itself with itself always in simplicity; beginning from beautiful 
things, a lover mounts upwards.32 There are two related points; first, a person is 
a target of beauty which the mind grasps.  Bodily beauty does not present itself 
in terms of physical parts; it partakes the entire person that the mind 
apprehends and contemplates.  Second, we can neither being in love nor falling 
in love with a target of beauty; both activities involve a reciprocal interaction.  
On the other hand, Phaedrus’ notion of personal love shows us that a person is 
attracted to those who closely match his view of an ideal person, and such an 
attraction tends to be visual, physical, erotic, emotional, sensual, etc.: all this 
can be inferred from the nature of the non-white horse.  Eryximachos who 
insists on the balance between heavenly and common love suggests that falling 
in love mostly begins with physical attraction from which a lover infers that the 
beloved might be intelligent, honest, trustworthy, appealing, sensitive, and 
caring.  If there are other undesirable qualities, it is possible to re-educate 
lovers.  With respect to personal love, falling in love seems to be a natural 
response to beauty, a person.  Once participants are attracted to one another, 
they are inspired in a positive manner to build an intimate relationship.  Being 
attracted to someone is much more than a person’s manner of speaking, 
buttock, eye color, muscles, face, simile, intelligence, breasts, height, legs, age, 
etc.  Socrates, on the other hand, does not commit himself to naming bodily 
parts as a constituent of beauty.  He uses ugly to show the opposite of 
beautiful, and it is an empty box in which bodily parts are excluded from its 
content.  In the Symposium, Socrates implicitly endorses other speakers’ views of 
personal love; for example, it is possible to heal an ailing body.  In Phaedrus, 
the dark horse does not see bodily parts per se as beauty, but the whole person 
is seen as ravishing.      
 
Alcibiades’ comments and other criticisms 
 
The last speaker in the circle is Alcibiades, who speaks about his 
personal love affair with Socrates, contends that he was treated indifferently.  
According to his discourse, it seems that he still loves Socrates and believes 
that Socrates loves Agathon.  Alcibiades intends to disrupt the relationship 
between Socrates and Agathon.  Socrates’ relationship with Alcibiades is non-
physical, and it is important to note that Alcibiades has practical knowledge 
about love and protests against being treated as an object that Socrates uses for 
his own ascend, using the victim as an instance of beauty in order to ascent to 
the form – the universal.  Alcibiades expresses a ‘simple truth’ by comparing 
Socrates to a god statue.  At the end of Alcibiades’ speech, everyone laughs; 
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this suggests that the speaker’s honesty is fully acknowledged; thus, nobody 
comments on it.  – this is a dialectic jump, giving a courteous closure to your 
narrative on the Symposium.   
Nussbaum’s objection, meanwhile, is that a single person’s love is 
essential and it should not be used as a mean for Socrates’ ascent.  Some 
philosophers use Alcibiades’ discourse to raise objections against Plato’s theory 
of love.  Let us look at her arguments more closely.  In Nussbaum’s contention 
for personal love, she considers Alcibiades’ poetic speech as being about a 
particular love, namely, it is a story of Alcibiades’ own life which he acquires 
through his own experience.  She states: “There are some truths about love 
that can be learned only through experience of a particular passion of one’s 
own.”33 Unlike truth which is established through philosophical reasoning, 
Alcibiades wants to tell the truth: “…(the) story of Socrates and of the love of 
Alcibiades for Socrates.”34 Alcibiades uses a narrative technique to express his 
feelings and emotions of his love for Socrates in a vivid manner, using images: 
statues of the gods, stone statues, a crack, crown, and thunder bolt.  Though 
Alcibiates’ love for Socrates is mostly physical, Nussbaum contends: “…the 
lover’s knowledge of a particular object which is gained through intimacy is 
unique and a valuable kind of practical knowledge.”35 
According to Nussbaum, personal love involves practical knowledge.  
It appears that she is sympathetic to Alcibiades’ story of his love for Socrates 
which is a particular love.  She contends: “I can choose to follow Socrates, 
ascending to the vision of the beautiful.  But I cannot take the first step on that 
ladder as long as I see Alcibiades.  I can follow Socrates only if, like Socrates, I 
am persauded of the truth of Diotima’s account; and Alcibiades robs me of this 
conviction.”36  Accordingly, she believes that Alcibiades’ story is about ordinary 
human beings who gain practical knowledge of love rather than having a 
definition or prescription of love given to them.   
We will reevaluate some criticisms that are raised against Plato’s view 
of love.  Nussbaum provides a detail analysis of Alcibiades’ revelation as being 
a particular case of a bitter lover, Socrates’ lover, and she questions the ascent 
as being consequential because love has a practical role in everyone’s life, for it 
is about humans’ intimacy, emotion, and intellect values in the world.37 She 
also analyzes Socrates’ way of life as being alienated from everyday reality and 
that his inner world is impenetrable by others.  Her evaluation and comment 
about Alcibiades’ confession are pertinent on the grounds that she maintains 
that after reading a theory of love it should, at least, make one’s life more 
meaningful with respect to improving one’s intersubjective relationship.  The 
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crux is that love should enhance one’s happiness, and this is robbed from 
Alcibiades.   
Let us construe her point of view in context.  First, Socrates cannot be 
anything else than the white horse that can only love without being in love.  
Accordingly, he might still love Alcibiades as well as Agathon.  Socrates is 
capable of loving several individuals at the same time; that is, we are alluding to 
a version of being out of love.  Socrates clearly argues in Phaedrus that a lover 
will never forsake his beautiful one.  Unfortunately, Alcibiades considers love 
like the non-white horse and forgets the doctrine of the dark horse: being in 
love requires a reciprocal sentiment, sexual attraction, and sensibility.  Thus, 
under no circumstance, Alcibiades can be in love in terms of being in love with 
Socrates.  This does not deny that Alcibiades actually loves Socrates, but it 
affirms that Socrates cannot experience being in love.  Second, it is possible 
that the last speech is intended as a precaution to others about how Socrates 
practices love and what love signifies for him.  With all of Alcibiades’ charms, 
he cannot lure Socrates into the indulgence of carnal pleasure.  Third, a 
Platonist might press the issue that Nussbaum’s charges apply to Socrates’ 
practice of love but not to Plato’s conception of love which is dualistic: the 
white horse and non-white horse.  The latter can be interpreted in terms of 
Phaedrus’ version of personal love.  One is aware of the fact that personal love 
has a temporal duration, for there is no explicit or implicit contract between 
lovers that their relationship will endure until one of them dies.  Gass argues 
that love comes and goes like the cloud.  If this is the case, Alcibiades should 
have known that the lifespan of being in love between individuals is temporal.  
In addition, Nussbaum reminds us that Alcibiades has practical knowledge of 
love; thus, it is evident that he abandons several lovers, and another separation 
should not be interpreted as a significant issue.  We should compliment 
Socrates for practicing what he teaches.  Fourth, from an existentialist point of 
view, Merleau-Ponty contends that a boy, for example, must be at the right age 
and maturity to fully experience the significance of sex.38 According to Holler, 
bodily sensibility is a prerequisite for pleasure and pain.  Thus, if Socrates is 
alienated from his body, he cannot experience being in love, and it is not 
possible that he deliberately uses any particular person, for his soul recognizes 
beauty and accents.  Finally, the distinction among falling in love, being in love 
and being out of love requires additional elucidation in order to fully account 
for Nussbaum’s remark and remove certain confusions which may arise from 
Socrates’ discourse.   
In most cases, falling in love leads to being in love, and when the later 
stage occurs, lovers intensively, emotionally, sensually, sexually, or intimately 
‘share’ themselves in an ontological manner.  That is, their attractions and 
affections are reciprocal.  On the other hand, being out of love is 
distinguishable from falling in love and being in love; for example, ‘Socrates 
loves Agathon’ does not mean ‘Agathon loves Socrates.’ In this context, 
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Socrates loves Agathon, Alcibiades, justice, literature, etc.  One may claim that 
being out of love constitutes an impersonal relationship to the extend that it is 
not equally reciprocal between individuals, and the sexual attraction and the 
desire to ‘share’ each other sexually and emotionally are absent.  This 
interpretation seems appropriate with respect to Socrates’ situation.  Though 
there are several reasons why being out of  love occurs, during an extensive 
period of living together, lovers switch from being in love to being out of  love 
and vice versa.  Gass acknowledges that love does not have a traditional 
significance: "Love is supposed to be a long-term proposition like loyalty, 
obedience, and trust(.)”39 A lover is expected to be emotionally and sensually 
attached to the beloved and in the following ways: being (altruistic, dependable, 
reliable, responsible, sexy, obedient, just, trustworthy: stable, a caring person, a 
reliable friend, a calm person, able to practice equality, forgive mistake, support 
the beloved), and having intuitive knowledge about the beloved’s feeling, 
behavior, and expectation.  When being in love becomes stagnated, other 
relations usually hold individuals together, and certain dependency relations 
carry lovers onward.  Though some dependency relations are related to being 
out of love, some lovers revolt against secondary relations in love.  In a given 
context in which lovers drift apart, some older people might consider 
themselves as losers if they separate from their companion because they have 
intrinsically invested in various ways toward their partner, and a separation 
might lead them to a worse fate: loneliness.   
In certain cases, if being out of love reaches a climax, some lovers try 
to renew their relationship by creating a romantic atmosphere in order to uplift 
themselves to a state of being in love.  Solomon writes: “It is evident enough 
that one set of desires in romantic love is the desire to be with, the desire to 
touch, the desire to caress, and here we are immediately reminded of 
Aristophanes’ lesson: that which manifests itself as a sexual urge in love is 
actually something much more, a desired to be reunited with, to be one with, 
one’s love.  From this, I want to suggest what I take to be the dominant 
conceptual ingredient in romantic love, which is just this urge for shared 
identity, a kind of ontological dependency.”40 Though an important disposition 
in being in love is sexual intercourse, the motive for a romantic evening can 
also involve changing the status of lovers’ being out of  love.  Morgan argues 
against romantic love on the grounds that: “…it produces harmful 
consequences especially for women because the dependents are often women 
than men.”41 Her remark is much more applicable to the concept of sharing 
identity because most dominant lovers believe that they can solve their 
problems by having sexual intercourse.  On the other hand, if both parties take 
the initiative to re-establish their ‘love relationship’ to the status of being in 
love, I agree with the idea of the urge to share identity because a romantic 
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evening suggests a mutual agreement between participants.  Horney questions 
dependent relationships between lovers; she states: “Marriage and love have 
nothing in common.  Marriage is primarily an economic arrangement…”42 
Living with a stranger and having children with that person do not require 
being in love; love as being out of  love binds individuals together with 
reference to certain shared values, and marriage is a formal dependency 
contract.  Goldman agrees with Horney and argues: “Love, the strongest and 
deepest element is all life, the harbinger of hope, of joy, of ecstasy; love, the 
deifier of all laws, of all conventions; love, the freest, the most powerful molder 
of human destiny; how can such an all-compelling force be synonymous with 
the poor little State and Church – begotten weed, marriage.”43 It seems that she 
identifies the nature of personal love, for love suggests a phenomenal 
experience which surpasses any formal dependency relation, and with respect 
to Phaedrus’ view, we should add that love overcomes chaos.   
In our discussion of personal love as involving falling in love, being in 
love, and falling out of love, the latter shows us that dependencies are built 
around love and hold individuals together.  In addition, it has more to do with 
a lover’s relations than the beloved object; this does not restrict casual sex 
between individuals on the grounds that emotional attachment is sometimes 
unimportant.  Though being out of  love can be critical or non-critical for 
humans, Socrates neither abuses Alcibiades nor uses him, for there is a 
misunderstanding between Socrates and Alcibiades.  The latter believes that he 
is in love (being in love) with Socrates and hopes that the other person feels 
the same way toward him.  Unfortunately, Socrates is not sexually attracted to 
Alcibiades; this sort of misconception is common among people, especially 
when one person takes the other as a good friend, but the other party 
conceives of their relationship differently.  Thus, Nussbaum’s remarks about 
Socrates uses his love of Alcibiades to promote his own ascent should be taken 
in terms of Socrates is helpless whenever he confronts beautiful things, and he 
is a victim of the destiny of his own soul.  Moreover, Gass seems to put the 
issue in perspective by arguing that personal love is not a lifelong commitment.   
Vlastos also objects to Plato’s theory of love and he writes: 
 
We are to love the person so far, and only insofar, as they 
are good and beautiful.  Now since all too few human 
beings are masterworks of excellence, and now even the 
best of those we have the chance to love are wholly free 
of steaks of the ugly, the mean, the commonplace, the 
ridiculous, if our love for them is to be only for their 
virtue and beauty, the individual, in the uniqueness and 
integrity of his or her individuality, will never be the 
object of our love.  This seems to me the cardinal flaw of 
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Plato’s theory of love.  It does not provide for love of 
whole persons, but only for love of that abstract version 
of persons which consists of the complex of their best 
qualities.  This is the reason why personal affection ranks 
so low in Plato’s scala amor is… This high climatic 
moment of fulfillment – the peak achievement for which 
all lesser loves are to be used as steps – is the one farthest 
removed from affection for concrete human beings.44      
 
If human beings are not par-excellence, some of our qualities are not 
beautiful.  If Plato’s theory of love is about the whole person but not only 
about a person’s beauty and goodness, Vlastos would accept it.  On the other 
hand, Vlastos believes that Plato’ version of love is specifically about a person’s 
beauty not about the entire person.  It is quite clear that the white and non-
white horses respond to beauty.  If the object (the entire object) of love is not 
beautiful, the horses will not be attracted by it.  On the other hand, if Vlastos is 
arguing that everyone has some beautiful and ugly qualities, Plato provides a 
misconception of human beings.  But Plato’s thesis is about there are particular 
cases of beauty in the physical world.  This is the issue not that a person is both 
beautiful and ugly.   
It is important to consider the entire Symposium not only Socrates’ view 
because it is relevant to our understanding of the different aspects of love, say, 
personal love.  In Phaedrus, we learn that the non-white horse pursues 
pleasure.  In other words, it enjoys beauty, a person, and Socrates does not 
refer to a person as composite.  Socrates loves beauty as well as justice, 
fairness, the sunset, and knowledge; here we do not refer to, for example,   
fairness in terms of its composite.  Furthermore, Eryximachos reminds us 
about the balance between heavenly love and common love, indicating that the 
whole person should be taken as the object of love.  Socrates insists that the 
object of love is the entire person, and this view is supported by Exupéry who 
states that what is essential is not visible.  Thus, Socrates denies reducing a 
person to composite.  Although I sympathize with Vlastos’ remark because the 
love of beauty and goodness seems suspicious, Socrates does not intend to 
express an ambiguous view.  Price argues: “To infer that what I really love is 
not a person, but a complex of repeatable qualities and irrepeatable relations, 
seems a category-mistake: we must not confuse the object of emotion with its 
grounds – whether these are its reasons, citable by the subject, or its causes, 
perhaps hidden from him(.)”45 A lover’s relation to an object can be shown in 
terms of how he feels and thinks about that object, and his relation and feeling 
do not change the status of the object; another person might conceive of that 
object differently.  Socrates loves beautiful things, and the sunset is beautiful; 
hence, he loves the sunset.  Here, we can consider a lover’s relation to the 
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object, beauty or a person, but an object is taken as a unique entity; 
accordingly, we do not usually pick out the composite of the sunset.   
According to citation twenty-six, Socrates clearly indicates that a lover will 
never forsake a beautiful one.  This suggests that he is alluding to the whole 
person.   
With respect to the forementioned objection and the notion of 
personal love, Soble, who does not consider his own remark as an objection, 
states: “Plato’s view does not apply to personal love in exactly the way 
suggested by his formula – a person loves just and only the beauty and virtue X 
finds in the beloved Y… For Plato, we love the person’s courage and 
intelligence, but in no sense he, himself.”46 I think that Soble is referring to 
Plato’s official view; this appears to be the case on the grounds that quote 
twenty-six and its ramifications have been neglected.  In addition, personal love 
can be inferred from the nature of the non-white horse, and this point is well 
taken up in this paper.  I should insist that if Phaedrus’ perspective of love is 
not considered as Plato’s one, Soble’s comments has some weight which 
merely scratches the surface of Plato’s general theory of love; in addition, Soble 
intends his view as a consolidated comment between Vlastos and Plato.   
According to the simile in Phaedrus, the white horse signifies the highest level 
of love; on the other hand, the non-white one suggests personal love between 
lovers, and it is about intense sexual attractions; the charioteer stands between 
both realms and he seems to find a compromise and endorses immorality 
through birthing.   
 
Part Two 
 
According to the nature of the non-white horse in Phaedrus there 
seems to be the ecstasy of love, a madness between lovers, which surpasses 
that which is involved in mere personal love and sexual pleasure.  In the 
Symposium, Aristophanes’ discourse fills in the missing link about another aspect 
of love: erotic love.  After his hiccup, Aristophanes glorifies the power of love 
and indicates that if we had known such power, we would have built 
sanctuaries and altars and scarified to it; his view, I argue, is about erotic love.  
He contends that human beings were hermaphrodite: “My second point is that 
the shape of each human being was completely round, with back and sides in a 
circle; they had four hands each, as many legs as hands, and two faces, exactly 
alike, on a round neck.  Between the two faces, which were on opposite sides, 
was one head with four ears… In strength and power, therefore, they were 
terrible, and they had great ambitions.  They made an attempt on the gods(.)” 47 
Because of theirs attempt, Zeus has a scheme to remove ‘man’s wild way by 
making them weaker’, so he slices through the middle, turning the face of each 
half to face the cut and with a little touching up of the cut part; thus, we have a 
male half and a female one from a round person.  Aristophanes states: “Now, 
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since their natural form had been cut in two, each one longed for its own other 
half, and so they would throw their arms about each other, weaving themselves 
together, wanting to grow together… Love is born into every human being; it 
calls back the halves of our original nature together; it tries to make one out of 
two and heal the wound of human nature.”48 Love is ingrained in human 
beings and each person seeks his other half; the power of love resides in us and 
we crave for our other tally.  When one half meets the other one, they are 
overwhelmed with affection and passion and never wish to be apart – an 
ecstasy is found in the melting of themselves into one another: “The two are 
struck from their senses by love by a sense of belonging to one another, and by 
desire, and they don’t want to be separated from one another, not even for a 
moment.”49 Aristophanes argues that if the god of fire, Hephaistos, offers 
lovers to melt and weld them together, they will accept it.   
Aristophanes provides sufficient information about the nature of a 
‘complete’ person as being wild and threatening the gods with their madness; 
the attachment of both halves constitutes a harmony because the melting effect 
overflows from each half in order to bring about a unity.  This lays the 
foundation of how erotic love should be interpreted.  Do we conceive of erotic 
love as involving only physical or sexual pleasure? Sexual intercourse is an 
important part of erotic love.  What is erotic love? This is a central question, 
and we will try to answer it.   
In other primates, sexual reproduction involves courtship behavior, 
and some animals’ courtship displays are quite elaborated.50 We consider 
mating behavior as largely motivated by hormones and instinct when animals 
reach maturity.  After a male or female has been found, courtship may arouse 
sexual motivation, and their synchronized behavior is cues for copulation.   
Flamingoes display a ritual – their elaborated behavior is synchronized with 
head flogging, neck being erect, bill angling upward, head turning from side to 
side, and wings extending and retracting repeatedly.  All this is like a 
harmonious dance between partners, and their movements are well 
synchronized and continue until the male mounts onto the female. 
With the exception of being instinctive, erotic love in humans is 
mostly unfolded like courtship displays.  This type of love is highly charged 
with bodily expressions – intensive caressing and bodily movements.  It 
appears as though partners tangle each other like a snake, move effortlessly in 
bed in various positions, kiss each other overwhelmingly, and have intense 
bodily contact: these displays show an attempt to melt each other.  For an 
observer, participants’ behavior seems very passionate and romantic in bed, for 
bodily movements between individuals occur harmoniously as though each 
bodily part has a mind in itself; lovers behave as though they want to get under 
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each other’s skin – the melting phenomena.  Loosing self-control over one’s 
body is often displayed in terms of biting and scratching; this  happens when 
their emotions and sensations become uncontrollable, and the urge to fuse the 
other to oneself is predominant.  However, biting and scratching are 
unintentional actions.  Partners’ displays are synchronized until sexual 
intercourse; sexual intercourse is the climax – the welding phenomena.  With 
respect to erotic love, both participants are highly stimulated and equally 
excited until the melting changes to welding. 
Displays in erotic love are quite unique; each act occurs spontaneously, 
depending on participants’ moods, physical and psychological states of affairs, 
situation, etc; thus, erotic dispositions are not repeatable on the grounds that a 
participant’s subjectivity has a primary function in determining displays.   
Accordingly, erotic love is viewed as spontaneous courtship displays, and it has 
a temporal duration which is often dependent on participants’ situations.   
Under no circumstances, it is suggested that in erotic love one person tries to 
demoralize the other.  It is claimed that erotic love is unique with respect to a 
person’s mood, emotional, sensual, and physical conditions.  Because 
uniqueness and spontaneity are involved, erotic love is a creative act in which 
visual information is least important, but bodily sensations and expressions 
propel participants to a different state.   
The melting and fusing in erotic love show us how partners act and 
feel toward one another, and their actions and feelings are very intense and are 
considered as wild because there are no predefined rules about partners’ 
behavioral dispositions.  This is distinguishable from sadomasochism which is 
a paraphilia, combining both sadistic and masochistic sexual behavioral 
patterns.  Though the main characteristic of sadomasochism is the eroticizing 
of pain, at least, for an outsider, it is considered as mostly pleasurable and 
sexual arousing for a sadomasochist.  The sadist is the person who inflicts the 
pain or punishment, and the masochist submits to such humiliation.  In most 
cases, roles are exchanged.  The central characteristic of sadomasochism is the 
interchanging roles of dominance and submissive behavior.  Erotic love shares 
none of such characteristics, for participants’ displays gear toward acquiring a 
higher state of pleasure through harmonious bodily and sensual movements.  
One may argue that there is a degree of risk in erotic love.  This seems to be 
the case with qualifications; participants can accidentally get injury when 
physical movements do not occur harmoniously.  Injuries are not inflicted 
intentionally.  However, one should not confuse erotic love with gymnastic 
sexual positions which are often uncomfortable and offensive for one partner.  
Erotic love can be seen as a ritual with reference to synchronized behavior.  
Intensive pleasure is sought in the context of Aristophanes’ notion of melting 
and welding of partners.   
Though we regard erotic love as courtship displays, primates’ 
courtship behavior is more aggressive in displaying strength with a final goal: 
sexual intercourse.  Their displays are regular.  Humans, on the other hand, 
display their passion and their time span is irregular.  The final goal in this kind 
of love is also carnal pleasure, not procreation per se.  Erotic love is generally  
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distinguishable from ‘ordinary sex’.  The former is considered as an elaborate 
display, resembling a dance in which partners try to ‘melt’ and ‘weld’ 
themselves together.  Partners are in a state of readiness and participate equally; 
they do not refrain themselves in any particular manner – a degree of wildness 
is ingrained in erotic love.  The latter is less extensive in terms of it often 
involves caressing, sexual stimulation and arousal prior to sexual intercourse; in 
most cases, the dominant partner tends to impose his sexual desire onto his 
partner through caressing, and stimulating the sexual organs of the other to a 
point of sexual arousal and then penetration.  The submissive partner usually 
submits in order to avoid interpersonal conflict, anger, resentment, and hate; in 
addition, one partner tends to be rigid.  In rare cases, there might be a very 
brief form of erotic love that is very pleasurable for both participants.  Erotic 
love can lead to permanent relationship between partners, but this is not a 
requirement because it is much more dynamic and temporary.               
Personal love and erotic love are themes in Plato’s works.  Though 
Socrates objects to Aristophanes’ view that erotic love is not the highest level 
of love, he does not reject the doctrine of erotic love.  Because we discuss 
personal love and erotic love, we should also account for Kant’s criticism 
against sexual intercourse.  Kant’s second categorical imperative indicates that 
another person should be treated with dignity and respect, not as a mean or an 
object, but as an end in itself.  51 In his Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, he 
denounces sexual intercourse: “There is no way in which a human being can be 
made an object of indulgence of another except through sexual impulse… 
Sexual love makes of the loved person an object of appetite… Sexual love… 
by itself and for itself… is nothing more than appetite.  As an object of 
appetite for another person becomes a thing.”52 Sex is morally wrong because a 
lover uses the beloved as an object to satisfy himself sexually.  Holler 
comments: “Kant appears to have ordered all aspect of his life according to 
rigid schedules so as to eliminate any chance of spontaneity.  He never had a 
lasting intimate relationship and is said to have lost the opportunity for 
marriage by thinking about it for too long… Kant seems to have made his 
body into a machine to avoid feeling.”53 There is a parallel between Kant’s way 
of life and his view of sexual intercourse, and she also suggests that Kant is 
alienated from his bodily sensibility.  Because human existence relies of 
procreation, Kant shows us a way out by permitting sex in marriage: “The sole 
condition on which we are free to make use of our sexual desire depends upon 
the right to dispose over the person as a whole…If I have the right over the 
whole person, I also have the right…to use that person…for the satisfaction of 
sexual desire.  Only giving that person the same rights over the whole of myself 
– happens in marriage.  Matrimony is an agreement between two persons by 
which they grand each other equal reciprocal right, each of them undertaking 
                                                 
51 I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysical of Morals, trans. by  H.  Paton (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1963), 96. 
52 I. Kant, Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, trans., James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1964), 86. 
53 L. Holler, Sexual Morality (London: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 66-67.  
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to surrender the whole of their person to the other with a complete right of 
disposal over it.”54 In a marriage, a contract, the reciprocal transfer of a 
person’s rights to another overcomes using a partner as an object.  Today, 
people living together without a marriage contract give their consent to equal 
participation in sexual intercourse; lovers are much more altruistic in which 
rights are reciprocally exchanged.  Soble argues that causal sex, which is more 
or less spontaneous, does not permit partners to work out the necessary details 
of their rights, and that Kant’s view rejects causal sex, a one-night stand.55 It is 
not a question whether it is causal sex; participants do not condone it because 
much of the details are already worked out prior to the actual act.    
In conclusion, Jerome Neu considers the Symposium as one of the 
greatest works ever written about love.56 I have shown in this paper we can 
have a reasonable understanding of falling in love, being in love, being out of 
love, erotic love, and love for its own sake.  Plato’s works should be taken in 
terms of his official and unofficial views of love on the grounds that a lover 
ascents from personal love.  The simile of the white and non-white horses with 
a charioteer is used quite effectively with respect to how a person responds to 
beautiful things.  Erotic love shows us that love is like a flame, melting lovers 
together in their passions and sexual responsiveness.  Several criticisms against 
Plato’s view of love occur on the grounds that philosophers do not attend to 
the concept of being in love and being out of love in Plato’s works. 
 
Amo Sulaiman is the author of the novel Proud City.  He lives in Switzerland 
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